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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

against it to dispose of the same, although secured through an unlawful
purchase of stock." Again, in this case, Justices Brandeis, Holmes &
Stone dissented and here they were joined by Chief Justice Taft.
The Clayton Act (passed Oct. 15, 1914), attempted to effect in a
narrow field what the Sherman Anti Trust Act (July 2, 1890) was
unable to do. Is this act more effective than its predecessor? It seems
that it is not. We are living inan age of big business, of consolidation,
of merger. It seems useless for the Congress or the Courts to attempt
to stem the tide. It seems that we can only hope that these consolidations and mergers are for the common good and general welfare, for
today they carry on.
JOHN A. WALSH
Infants: Misrepresentation: Liability for Torts.
The case of the Wisconsin Loan & Finance Corp. v. Goodnough,
228 N.W. 484, was an action on a note signed by defendant. The defendant set up in his answer that he was at that time a minor and could
not be held on an action for payment of the note. The plaintiff demanded recovery on the grounds that the defendant misrepresented his
age, maintaining that he was legally capable of executing a note.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court enforced the minor's transaction with
the plaintiff, holding that a minor can be held on a tort liability for
misrepresentation and deceit.
The question which seems to divide courts in consideration of this
matter is whether or not the fraudulent representations enter into the
contract. In.Fitts v. Hail, 9 N.H. 411, after referring to the leading
English case of Johnson v. Pie, 1st Keb. 913, it was held: "The representation in Johnson v. Pie, and in the present case, that the defendantwas of full age, was not part of the contract, nor did it grow out
of the contract, or in any way result from it. It is not any part of its
terms, nor was it _he consideration upon which the contract was
founded. No contract was made about the defendant's age. The sale
of the goods was not a consideration for this affirmation or representation. The representation was not a foundation for an action of assumpsit. The matter arises purely ex delicto. The fraud was intended to
induce, and did induce, the plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of
the hats, but that by no means makes it part and parcel of the contract.
It was antecedent to the contract; and if an infant is liable for a positive wrong connected with a contract, but arising after the contract
has been' made, he may well be answerable for one committed before
the contract was entered into, although it may have led to the contract.
8 71 Cd. 405 at

411.

NOTES AND COMMENT

It has been said that 'all the infants in England might be ruined,' if
infants were bound by acts that sound in deceit. But this cannot be a
reason why the action should not be maintained for fraudulent wrongs
done, for the same reason would seem to apply equally well in cases
of slander, trover, and trespass."
In the English case of Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill, (1914), 3 K.B. 607,
this question is thoroughly discussed, and it arrives at the conclusion
that an infant is not estopped to plead his infancy because he procured
a loan through false representations as to his age.
The question of non-liability is also adhered to in Raymond v. General Sales Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N.E. 359. The false claim of majority by a minor in order to effect a'trade does not estop him from disaffirming the transaction. Wieland v. Kobick, 110 Ill. 16; Whitcomb v.
Joslyn, 51 Vermont 79.
We have a stronger line of cases upholding the minor's liability,
to-wit:
Kuehl v. Means (Iowa) 218 N.W. 907, held one who, lacking only
a few months of majority and having the appearance of an adult, purchases in the name of a purported sales co. of which he represents
himself to be president, an automobile, possession of which he retains
until after he becomes of age, cannot disaffirm the contract. A minor
who delivers his personal check to the manager of a partnership of
which he is a member, for deposit to account of the partnership, cannot, after the money has been withdrawn on partnership check for a
partnership, purchase in favor of one .ignorant of his connection with
the transaction, disaffirm the contract, and recover the money from the
vendor who is innocent of any fraud.
Latrobe v. Dietrich, 114 Maryland 8, 78 Atl. 983, on this point holds:
In a case where it appears that an infant entered into a contract of
partnership with an adult, and subsequently sought to have the contract
set aside, such a contract is not void; but only voidable. The infant
can avoid it only on some other ground than the fact of his mere infancy. (Also Lowery v. Cate, 108 Tenn., 54, 64 S.W. 1068.
The law is solicitous in holding the infant liable for his torts, not to
impair the immunity given him, against liability on his contracts. The
tort must be a "tort simpliciter," and not on the essence of which is a
breach of contract. 183 Mass. 317,. 191 Mass. 151, 203 N.Y. 465; Lowery v. Cate, 108 Tenn. 54, 64 S.W. 1068, which is stated later; also 157
Wis. 113 following on this point..
And in case of doubt, the tendency has been to favor the infant and
to hold it more important to preserve his immunity from contract liability, than to enforce his liability for torts. 175 Mass. 513.
The cases quite uniformly hold that the fraud must be actual, not
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constructive; that mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not
sufficient. This, quite apparently for the reason that the infant himself
may be -unaware of the legal consequences of his acts, and that it is
his affirmative wrongdoing which leads to liability.
In the instant case the plaintiff paid the money involved in this case
in reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentations as to his contractual capacity. He is not held liable on the contract, but for damages
in deceit; therefore the question of benefit does not arise as in cases
where he is held liable by way of estoppel. Being liable in deceit for
the damages sustained by the plaintiff on account of the deceit, the
defendant may not escape this liability by disaffirmance or repudiation.
The defendant not being liable upon the contract, he is not liable either
for the attorney's fees or for interest above the legal rate.
JOHN S. BROSEMER

Inheritance Tax: Non-Resident Decedent: Bonds.
The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion dated January 6, 1930, decides that a state cannot assess an inheritance tax on
a transfer of personalty in the form of securities issued by the state
so attempting to tax, where the said securities are owned by a nonresident decedent and kept within the state of his domicile. The case
is that of the "FarmersLoan and Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota," 50
Sup. Ct. 98; 74 L. Ed. 190.
The facts were as follows: One Taylor while domiciled and residing in New York died intestate leaving as part of his estate negotiable
bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by the state of Minnesota and the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. These certificates
passed under his will and were taxed in New York. Minnesota assessed
a tax upon the same transfer which was approved by her Supreme
Court (176 Minn. 634; 222 N.W. 528) and from this decision the
executor of Taylor's estate appealed.
The appellant, executor, contended that such taxation by the state
of Minnesota conflicts with Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.
Counsel for the state of Minnesota contended that the obligations
were debts of that state and her corporations, (Minneapolis and St.
Paul), and that her laws gave them validity, protected them, and provided means for enforcing payment. On this theory Minnesota claimed
situs for taxation purposes.
Under the rule of Blodgett v. Silberman (277 U.S. 1; 48 S. Ct. 410),
these certificates of indebtedness are to be considered as any other

